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INTRODUCTION
MULTI- AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY: MERE 
THEORY OR JUST PRACTICE? 
 
‘As lawyers we cannot simply accept the conclusions of others; we must 
make them our own, and to do this we need to step out of the legal culture 
and into that of the other one. In doing this we are not picking up “findings” 
but ‘learning a language’, wrote James Boyd White in 1990 in his book 
Justice as Translation. 
This third issue of Erasmus Law Review addresses multi- and 
interdisciplinarity in law from the perspective of legal methodology. Was 
Richard Posner right when as early as 1987 he foresaw the decline of law as 
an autonomous discipline? The explosion of ‘Law and…’ movements seems 
to suggest that he was. Nevertheless, methodological and epistemological 
questions of intellectual integration within interdisciplinary movements all 
too often remain underexposed. What then is the similarity – and that at a 
fundamental level – between the two disciplines connected by the word 
‘and’? And is the perceived connection between two disciplines in itself also 
an idea that should be elaborated? Or is interdisciplinarity only the 
importation of a technique or methodology from one field to another, for the 
sole purpose of solving a specific problem, the solution of which cannot be 
found in the original field itself?  
As far back as ten years ago, Jack Balkin suggested that the ‘and…’ 
discipline might be an invader, or a coloniser, as the case of Law and 
Economics in several of its forms would seem to suggest. The success of the 
invader is often explained on the basis of the dominant consensus within the 
field of economics on the subject of methodology, whereas law, especially in 
the common-law tradition, is an easy prey for domestication, given its 
casuistic approach when it comes to the acquisition of ‘knowledge’. In this 
respect – now that the word ‘law’ still figures prominently in the name of 
interdisciplinary fields – interdisciplinary scholarship seems to be the result 
of an incomplete or failed takeover. More attention therefore needs to be 
paid to the question of whether a truly common, epistemological ground is to 
be found when disciplines form alliances of the ‘Law and ...’ kind. And if so, 
what does this mean for the concept of legal doctrine that we espouse? All 
too often the categorisation of knowledge in law starts from the premise that 
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law is a domain of rules, and rules only; however, that is a simplification that 
runs the risk of marginalisation of the ‘Law and...’  based on it, now that in 
both common-law and civil-law systems we have progressed beyond the 
formalist hermeneutics of more or less self-applying rules, and look upon 
law’s boundaries with notions derived from a contextual approach to law. 
Connected to all this is the problem of how to draw the boundaries when it 
comes to the difference between multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
perspectives in law, on the premise that this is not simply a semantic issue.  
The authors in this issue offer a wide range of responses to these and 
related questions in the field of interdisciplinary movements. In ‘Forms of 
Thought and Language’, James Boyd White starts with what he calls the 
obvious point that law does not, and could not, exist in an intellectual or 
linguistic vacuum. He claims that no one believes that the law is or should be 
impervious to other languages, to other bodies of knowledge; in this regard, 
to him the argument about the ‘autonomy’ of law is an empty one. In ‘Facing 
the Interface: Forensic Psychiatry and the Law’, Hjalmar van Marle 
addresses the issue of how the concept of mental illness needed explanation 
to fit into the framework of the criminal justice system. With the 
emancipation of empirical psychology and the progress made with respect to 
the examination of the brains of patients, using modern imaging techniques, 
a separation developed between a naturalistic view on criminal offences and 
empiricism with its claim that only those facts are true that can be measured 
in reproducible tests. To van Marle, it is absolutely necessary for judges and 
lawyers to be educated in the use of empirical data. Barbara Pozzo’s article, 
‘A Suitable Boy: The Abolition of Feudalism in India’, focuses on Law and 
Literature as a tool in teaching comparative law courses. She points to the 
importance of literature as a key in understanding the social impact of 
particular legal institutions. For Pozzo, this is particularly true in those cases, 
as in India, where the legal system consists of different layers: the 
traditional, the religious, and that of the colonial period. Finally, by referring 
to Vikram Seth’s novel, A Suitable Boy, her article examines a concrete 
example of the debate that concerned peasants’ property in the form of land 
as well as the abolition of the zamindar. In ‘Eclecticism in Law and 
Economics’, Alessandra Arcuri claims that the troubles begin when it comes 
to defining Law and Economics. Should the field be defined in relation to its 
subject matter or in relation to the methodology used? Because legal-
economic scholars have analysed almost all fields of law, it is difficult to 
define Law and Economics in relation to its subject matter. Arcuri’s essay 
takes a critical stand and demonstrates that the narrow focus on efficiency 
and rational choice theory pays a disservice to what could be a fruitful and 
truly interdisciplinary study of the legal phenomenon. 
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